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Reliability, Margin for Error and Self-Knowledge∗
Paul E´gre´†
CNRS - Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris
Knowledge is more than justified true belief. Plato was certainly the first to state the
lesson when he had Socrates argue that knowledge (episteme`) is more than true belief (ale`the`s
doxa), and even more than true belief with an account or justification (logos). The lesson was
later enforced by Russell, who also argued that knowledge is more than true belief. Thus,
you don’t know that the name of the Prime Minister starts with a B if you believe that the
Prime Minister is Balfour, and if the actual Prime Minister is in fact Bannerman (Russell
1912, 131). In his celebrated paper, Gettier produced even more convincing examples, by
adding that there can even be a good justification to believe a true proposition, without that
justification being appropriate for the truth of that proposition. Consequently, it seems that
the knowledge of a proposition p is the true belief of that proposition, with a justification
that is appropriate for the truth of that proposition. But what does it take for a justification
to be appropriate for the truth of a proposition?
In recent work, Timothy Williamson has defended the controversial thesis that a conjunc-
tive analysis of knowledge such as: “knowledge is true belief with an appropriate justification”
is doomed to failure, for it might be that no good account of the notion of appropriate jus-
tification can be framed without resorting to the very concept of knowledge by which we
started. The thesis of Williamson that there can be no reductive and non-circular analysis
of knowledge in terms of belief with other conditions has been the main focus of attention
of his most recent book, Knowledge and its Limits. Despite this, Williamson firmly agrees
that knowledge is a form of reliable belief. Thus Williamson writes: “if one believes p truly
in a case α, one must avoid false belief in other cases sufficiently similar to α in order to
count as reliable enough to know p in α” (2000, 100). In Williamson’s account of knowledge,
this notion of reliability is cashed out in a series of principles, which Williamson calls margin
for error principles, and which he relates to a more general notion of safety. The interest of
these principles is twofold: first, they provide the basis for a modal analysis of the concept
of reliability of knowledge in the framework of epistemic logic. Secondly, and more substan-
tially, Williamson has argued that knowledge is not transparent, namely that one can know a
proposition without knowing that one knows it, and margin for error principles play a decisive
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role for the validity of this thesis.
The present paper pursues two objectives: the first is an attempt to refine and systematize
the modal analysis of the reliability of knowledge given by Williamson, and to delimit the
scope of margin for error principles. The second is a criticism of Williamson’s thesis that
knowledge is not transparent, elaborating on previous work by Dokic & E´gre´ (2004), and
based on the intuition that knowledge is modular and that a representation of this modularity
is needed at the logical level in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusions which result from
Williamson’s assumptions. The paper is structured in two main parts: in the first part, I
distinguish several concepts of reliability and use these distinctions to evaluate the limits of
application of margin for error principles. In the second part, I examine the consequences
margin for error principles might have concerning the reliability of self-knowledge.
1 Reliability and Margin for Error
Knowledge is a form of reliable belief, or belief with a good justification. It is a problem,
however, to specify in sufficiently general terms what counts as a reliable belief, or as a good
justification. In this section, my aim is to clarify the notion of knowledge reliability, in relation
to the analysis Williamson has given of the concept of reliability qua truth at relevantly similar
cases. More specifically, the aim of this section will be to contrast several related notions of
reliability, namely the notions of safety, robustness, sensitivity, and margin of error, and to
discuss their generality. This clarification will prepare the ground for the closer examination
of margin for error principles given in section 2.
1.1 Knowledge and reliable belief
In the Theaetetus, Plato imagined the following dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus.
Socrates asks: “When someone, at the time of learning writes the name of “Theaetetus”,
and thinks that he ought to write and does write “Th” and “e”; but, again meaning to write
the name of “Theodorus”, thinks that he ought to write and does write “T” and “e”– are
we going to say that he knows the first syllable of your names?” (207e-208a, tr. B. Jowett,
revised by myself).1 To this question, Theaetetus agrees with Socrates that a negative answer
should be given.
This little piece of dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus concerns our knowledge of
a particular concept. Socrates is concerned with what it takes to know “the first syllable
of “Theaetetus” and “Theodorus””. On one interpretation, this could mean: “to know that
“Theaetetus” starts with “Th-e” and to know that “Theodorus” starts with “Th-e””. Clearly
then, someone who fails to believe that “Theodorus” starts with “Th-e” can’t know any
proposition where this condition enters as a conjunct. This interpretation, however, trivializes
Socrates’s point a bit. Another, more interesting way to interpret this passage is the following:
according to Socrates, you can’t really know that “Theaetetus” starts with “Th-e”, if you
believe that “Theodorus” start with “T” followed by “e”. In other words: even if you give
“Theaetetus” the correct spelling, your belief that “Theaetetus” starts with “Th-e” is not
reliable enough to count as knowledge if it becomes false at a relevantly similar case like
1Note that “Th” is the English transliteration for the one Greek letter θ, and “e” the English transliteration
for the Greek ε. Likewise for “t”, which is the transliteration of the Greek τ . Plato refers to each of them by
their names “theta”, “ei” (another name for “epsilon”, which might have also referred to the way the letter
was pronounced in Greek) and “tau”. See also the translation of Levett in Burnyeat (1990, 345, fn 61).
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“Theodorus”. What this little piece of dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus brings to
light, then, is nothing but the problem of what counts as a reliable belief.
Let us represent by t the name “Theaetetus”, by t′ the name “Theodorus”, and by P the
predicate “starts with “Th-e””. Using the vocabulary of epistemic logic, Socrates’s require-
ment on knowledge may be expressed more formally in the following way:
(1) KP (t) → ¬B¬P (t′)
that is you don’t know that “Theaetetus” starts with “Th-e” if you believe that “Theodorus”
does not start with “Th-e”.
Another way of interpreting Socrates’s requirement would be to impose, not only that one
fails to believe that “Theodorus”, for instance, starts with “T-e” instead of “Th-e”, but also
that one does hold the belief that “Theodorus” starts with “Th-e”. In that case, Socrates’s
requirement may be stated by the following, more positive constraint, namely you don’t know
that “Theaetetus” starts with “Th-e” unless you believe that “Theodorus” starts with “Th-e”:
(2) KP (t) → BP (t′)
The strength of this analysis rests crucially on the hypothesis that t and t′ are relevantly
similar names. To say that “Theaetetus” and “Theodorus” are relevantly similar, in this
situation, may be to say that they share the same property of starting with “Th” followed
by “e”. To articulate both principles more explicitly, one may therefore write both principles
in the following schematic form, where t and t′ now are to be read as universally quantified
variables (that is each of the formulas in the rest of this section is implicitly prefixed by
∀t∀t′.):
(3) KP (t) → (P (t′) → ¬B¬P (t′))
(4) KP (t) → (P (t′) → BP (t′))
The first condition says that, in order to know that t is P , one can’t believe of some t′
that is also P that it is not P . The second condition says that, in order to know that t is P ,
one has to believe of every t′ that is P that it is P . These principles, however, seem to put
very strong requirements on what it takes to know something. I know, for instance that 5 is
a prime number. Do I believe, of any other number that is a prime, that it is a prime? This
certainly is not something I believe explicitly, if we think of those very large numbers about
which I have not the least idea whether they are prime or not. Hence condition (4) seems
prima facie too strong, since it says: in order to know that a property holds of an object, one
ought to have correct beliefs about its complete extension.
On the other hand, condition (3) might be easier to fulfill. Suppose there is some number
of which I believe that it is not a prime. Then it ought not to be a prime. The standards
by which I judge that 5 is a prime should also secure as true my belief that such and such
distinct number is not a prime. Still, this rules out the possibility of being fallible while
retaining knowledge. For instance, I know that Paris is a capital. But suppose I believe that
Washington DC is not a capital (because I think New York City is the capital of the US):
should that prevent my belief that Paris is a capital from constituting knowledge?
In practice, however, requirements as the ones we just stated certainly do hold of some
particular instances. For instance, if someone believes that 5 is prime but does not believe
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that 7 is prime, we would certainly deny her the knowledge that 5 is prime. In that situation,
7 is not only similar to 5 by the fact that it is a prime, it is also very close to 5 in the sequence
of natural numbers. Thus, in the case of 5 and 7, most people would probably agree that a
condition like (4) does hold, namely: you don’t know that 5 is a prime if you don’t hold the
belief that 7 is a prime. Maybe the same condition applies to 11 with respect to 7, and then
to 13 with respect to 11. However, it certainly does not hold of 577, which is also a prime,
with respect to 5. The idea is that 577 is already quite far from 5 in the sequence of natural
numbers in order to count as similar enough for a condition like (4) to apply. Likewise, I
might temporarily hold the wrong belief that 1321 is not a prime, without this impugning on
my knowledge that 5 is a prime, in which case even the weaker condition (3) would fail to
hold.
What we ought to do, therefore, is relativize Socrates’s requirements to relevant standards
of similarity. This kind of relativization is needed if we want to explain that we are capable of
knowledge without being omniscient (condition (4)), and also that we are capable of knowledge
while being fallible (condition (3)). Thus, to use an example much similar to Socrates’s
original example, certainly most speakers of French who know how to write and read also
know that the word “the´aˆtre” starts with “th”. But then, they should know that the adjective
“the´aˆtral”, which is morphologically related, also starts with “th”. Yet would we say of the
same educated person who thinks that the word “thuya” is spelt “tuya” (and who knows the
meaning of the word), that they don’t really know that “the´aˆtre” starts with “th” after all?
Maybe some purists would say this, but most people certainly would not. What this suggests
is that the standards by which we consider that a piece of knowledge should depend on some
other crucial set of beliefs depend on what we count as relevantly similar cases. In this respect
the word “thuya” is less similar to “the´aˆtre” than “the´aˆtral” is, not being morphologically
related. As a consequence, a more adequate formulation of conditions (4) and (3) above might
be:
(5) KP (t) → (t ∼ t′ → (P (t′) → ¬B¬P (t′)))
(6) KP (t) → (t ∼ t′ → (P (t′) → BP (t′)))
where t ∼ t′ means that t and t′ are relevantly similar.
Conditions (3) and (4) correspond to normative principles about knowledge. Ideally, in
order to reliably know that some property holds of an object, one ought to know the complete
extension of that property. Realistically, however, to reliably know that some property holds of
an object is to be able to discriminate whether the property holds or not of sufficiently similar
cases. Thus, conditions (5) and (6) are relativized in a way which makes them descriptively
more adequate. Condition (5) says that in order to know that t is an instance of P , then one
should not have false beliefs about some t′ which is also P and which is relevantly similar to
t. Condition (6) requires that one should moreover have correct beliefs about any t′ which is
also a P and which is relevantly similar.
Once again, the standards which govern this notion of similarity may vary. For a demand-
ing number theorist, for instance, the actual knowledge of the first 100 primes may be required
to say that someone reliably knows that 5 is prime (“How can you know that 5 is prime if you
don’t know that 1321 is prime?”). More plausibly, however, a well-trained mathematician
would probably consider that to know that 5 is prime is to master the definition of “prime”
in such a way that conditions (3) and (4) are in principle satisfiable. Practically, however,
what seems required is that someone who is able to apply Euclid’s algorithm (for instance) to
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the case of 5 is also able to apply it to “neighbouring” numbers, numbers for which the cal-
culations don’t take significantly more time. As we know, however, the distribution of prime
numbers is such that, to continue to apply the algorithm, it takes more and more calculations
in order to know that the next prime is indeed the next prime. If two primes count as similar
enough when the calculations needed to establish that they are prime take about the same
time, then this suffices to explain that we can know that n is prime without yet knowing
which is the next prime.
By parity of analysis, we may wonder if we can say of someone who truly believes that
5 is a prime, but who wrongly believes that 6 is a prime, that they really know that 5 is a
prime. Thus, to (3) and (4) there correspond two further conditions:
(7) KP (t) → (¬P (t′) → ¬BP (t′))
(8) KP (t) → (¬P (t′) → B¬P (t′))
The first condition requires that in order to know that t is P , one should not have false beliefs
about things that are not P . The second again is stronger, since it requires that one does
believe then that they are not P . We know from logic that the latter condition is hard to
come by, since the standards by which I judge that something is a P may sometimes not be
sufficient to ascertain that something is not a P . If we think of P as the property of being a
logical validity of first-order logic, for instance, a condition like (7) can be secured by the use
of a complete proof method, but not a condition like (8), since there is no decision method
for first-order logic.
In practice, however, we can get more realistic approximations of conditions (7) and (8)
if we restrict them by reference to a range of similar cases. For instance, if I know that this
formula is a logical validity, I ought to believe that this other formula which requires about
the same number of proof steps is also a logical validity. And analogously for a sufficiently
similar formula (in the same sense of similar) that is not a logical validity. Thus conditions
(7) and (8) can be modified in the way we modified (3) and (4), namely:
(9) KP (t) → (t ∼ t′ → (¬P (t′) → ¬BP (t′)))
(10) KP (t) → (t ∼ t′ → (¬P (t′) → B¬P (t′)))
Putting together conditions (5), (6), (9) and (10), we can summarize the point of our
analysis in the following way: the more robust our knowledge that some object t is P , the
more it will extend to similar cases that are P , and the more it will discriminate between
similar cases that are not P . Those standards of similarity may vary, but here again, the
more inclusive the relation of similarity will be, the stronger our knowledge should be too.
1.2 Reliability as safety vs. reliability as robustness
The remarks of the previous section were given in order to introduce the general analysis
Williamson has presented of the notion of reliability of knowledge. Williamson writes that
“Reliability resembles safety, stability, and robustness” and points out that “these terms
can all be understood in several ways” (2000, 124). In this section, we shall actually refine
the distinction between the notions of safety and the notions of robustness in the case of
knowledge, on the basis of Williamson’s analysis of the notion of reliability. The idea is quite
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natural: safety of knowledge is defined by Williamson as avoidance of false belief for similar
cases. We define robustness as propensity to true belief for similar cases. Both notions can
be related in a natural way to Nozick’s analysis of the reliability of knowledge in terms of
sensitivity.
According to Williamson, “something happens reliably in a case α if and only if it happens
(reliably or not) in every case similar enough to α” (2000, 124). The consequence Williamson
draws in the case of knowledge is the following: “if one believes p truly in a case α, one must
avoid false belief in other cases sufficiently similar to α in order to count as reliable enough to
know p in α” (2000, 100). This condition can be expressed in propositional modal logic, in a
way which establishes a close connection to our previous remarks on the mastery of concepts.
Williamson’s requirement can indeed be stated in the following way (letting t and t′ denote
arbitrary contexts – I shall talk indifferently of contexts, cases or worlds in what follows):
(11) t |= Kp only if for every t′ such that t ∼ t′ and t′ |= p, t′ |= ¬B¬p
(12) t |= Kp only if for every t′ such that t ∼ t′ and t′ |= ¬p, t |= ¬Bp
These two conditions correspond to the two conditions (5) and (9) of the previous section,
here repeated as:
(13) KP (t) → (t ∼ t′ → (P (t′) → ¬B¬P (t′)))
(14) KP (t) → (t ∼ t′ → (¬P (t′) → ¬BP (t′)))
The difference between the two formulations is that we now identify objects with contexts,
and properties with propositions (as is standard in modal logic). Following a suggestion
originally made by J. van Benthem and investigated by I. Arnesen (see section 1.3 below),
conditions (11) and (12) can be given yet a more compact form if we express the notion of
similarity between contexts by means of an explicit closeness or neighborhood modality. We
shall note ¤ this modality. Following Arnesen, we assume it is a normal operator, satisfying
t |= ¤p iff for all t′ such that t ∼ t′, t′ |= p. Using this operator, the previous conditions can
be rephrased in the following way:
(15) Kp → ¤(p → ¬B¬p)
(16) Kp → ¤(¬p → ¬Bp)
Those two conditions correspond to Williamson’s concept of safe belief (note that the
strict conditionals in each of the consequents are equivalent if p is given a schematic reading,
but (15) and (16) need not be). Condition (16), in particular, as Williamson observes (2000,
148-150), is closely related to one of the conditions set forth by Nozick in his analysis of
knowledge.2 According to Nozick, knowledge is true belief, which is counterfactually sensitive
to truth. Thus, for X to know that p, X has to be in a state such that, if p were not the
2Williamson’s concept of safety is even more closely related to the concept of safety introduced by E. Sosa
(see Williamson 2000, 151), which Sosa contrasts with Nozick’s notion of sensitivity and which he defends as
a more plausible requirement on knowledge. See in particular Sosa (1999), where a belief is called safe if and
only if it satisfies the contrapositive of Nozick’s condition 3, that is: Bp > p (X would believe p only if it were
the case that p). Sosa therefore defines safety in terms of a counterfactual conditional, and not as a strict
conditional.
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case, X would not believe p. Representing the counterfactual conditional by the symbol >,
Nozick’s condition 3 can be stated (¬p > ¬Bp) and leads to the following requirement on
knowledge (which I also refer to as “condition 3” eponymously):
(17) Kp → (¬p > ¬Bp) (Nozick’s condition 3)
Nozick’s condition 3 is intended to exclude standard Gettier cases. In the case of Russell’s
example, for instance, supposing that X already believes the name of the Prime Minister is
“Balfour”, while it is in fact “Bannerman”, it is plausible enough that if the name of the Prime
Minister started with an “N”, X would still believe that it is “Balfour”, and therefore would
still believe that it starts with a “B”. Consequently, his belief displays a lack of sensitivity to
truth, and X can’t be said to know that the name of the Prime Minister starts with a “B” in
the actual context.
Unlike Nozick’s sensitivity condition, Williamson’s condition is stated in terms of a strict
conditional, with a neighborhood modality expressing similarity between contexts. Nozick’s
counterfactual conditional, if understood relative to a Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for condi-
tionals, makes a distinct requirement on the possession of knowledge. Indeed, condition (16)
can be expressed in contraposed form as: Kp → ¤(Bp → p). This requires only that one’s
belief be true at all the worlds that are relevantly similar to the actual world where p is
known. This is not sufficient to guarantee that one’s belief will not be false at the closest
worlds where ¬p holds, however. Likewise, as Williamson notes, Kp → (¬p > ¬Bp) could be
true at the actual world, without Kp → ¤(¬p → ¬Bp) being true at that world: it suffices
to imagine that ¬Bp holds at the closest ¬p worlds, without holding at all relevantly similar
¬p worlds.
Williamson’s safety conditions yield an analysis of the notion of reliability of knowledge
which therefore differs from Nozick’s. As we suggested with the examples of the previous
section, a safe belief that p is a belief which can be persistently true, if not with respect to the
whole set of worlds where p is true, at least with those p worlds that are relevantly similar to
the actual world. As we tried to motivate by analogy with the case of concepts, one properly
knows that a property holds of an object only if one is able to maintain that belief for a
relevant set of objects that also instantiate the property, and also if one is able to exclude a
relevant set of objects which do not fall under the property.
We can imagine, in this respect, stronger conditions than the ones considered by
Williamson, namely:
(18) Kp → ¤(p → Bp)
(19) Kp → ¤(¬p → B¬p)
These two conditions (18) and (19) stand to (15) and (16) as (6) and (10) stood to (5)
and (9) respectively. They now require that one does hold true beliefs at all relevantly similar
worlds to the world where p is known, and not simply that one avoids false beliefs at such
worlds. If we follow Williamson’s analysis, safety is a negative concept, much like immunity
to error. Positive conditions like (18) and (19) rather express some notion of robustness. To
clarify the examples we introduced in the previous section, we could say that one has robust
knowledge about prime numbers if one’s knowledge about primes is sufficiently inclusive, both
positively (¤(p → Bp)) and negatively (¤(¬p → B¬p)). Conversely, we could say that one
has safe knowledge about prime numbers if one’s knowledge is sufficiently immune to error,
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both positively (¤(p → ¬B¬p)) and negatively (¤(¬p → ¬Bp)). Williamson says relatively
little of this notion of robustness in his analysis, even though the definition we suggest is quite
natural.
Safety and robustness are indeed dual notions. Robust knowledge is also safe knowledge,
and unsafe knowledge can’t be robust. Yet some knowledge may be safe without being
robust. To get the correct entailment patterns, we need to make the assumption that beliefs
are coherent in the following sense: someone who explicitly believes ¬p ought not to be believe
p (namely B¬p → ¬Bp). Figure 1 gives a representation of this duality (¬p and p can be
exchanged uniformly to get the negative instance of Robustness and the positive instance of
Safety).
Robust
¤(p → Bp)
Unsafe
♦(p ∧B¬p)
Safe
¤(p → ¬B¬p)
Unrobust
♦(p ∧ ¬Bp)
Figure 1: Safety and Robustness
An example of safe knowledge which is unrobust is given in a case in which Kp holds at
world w, and yet such that there is a relevantly similar world w′ in which p holds, and such
that neither p nor ¬p are believed at that world. This is a situation of agnosticism in which
one’s knowledge is true and immune to error, and yet is not as inclusive as it could be.
Interestingly, a fourth condition in Nozick’s counterfactual analysis of the reliability of
knowledge bears a connection to the notion of robustness we just introduced. This condition
is expressed by Nozick as (p > Bp) and makes the following requirement on knowledge:
(20) Kp → (p > Bp) (Nozick’s condition 4)
Nozick’s condition 4 states that, in order to know p, one has to believe p at all contexts
which are alternative to the actual context and in which p also holds. Suppose for instance
that X believes that the name of the Prime Minister is Bannerman, because he read it in
the newspaper, and it is indeed Bannerman. Now, if the context were different, and the
newspaper had mistakenly published “Balfour” instead of the correct name “Bannerman”, X
still ought to believe that the name of the Prime Minister is “Bannerman” and not “Balfour”.
This means that X’s belief should be reliable in a way that makes it truth-sensitive even in
cases in which the information channel goes wrong.
As emphasized by Williamson, Nozick’s condition 4, unlike condition 3, is not adequately
captured within the standard Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, since if knowing p entails believing
p truly, the actual world is already the closest world where p holds. Williamson therefore
suggested that Nozick’s truth-conditions for the conditional (p > Bp) should be equivalent to
those of the strict conditional ¤(p → Bp), whenever p already holds at the world of evaluation
(see Williamson 2000, 149). If this asymmetry in truth-conditions is granted (a variably strict
conditional when the antecedent is false at the actual world, and a strict conditional when
the antecedent is true at the actual world), then Nozick’s condition 4 is formally equivalent
to what we defined as robustness.
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This common logical form should not hide some important conceptual differences, how-
ever. The meaning of Nozick’s condition 4 would probably be more adequately expressed by
reference to a particular “method of coming to believe”, or to some verb expressing the way
information is acquired by the believer. Let us write Hp to mean that X is given (truly or not)
the information that p. We shall call “being told p” this property. The notion of robustness
expressed through condition 4 entails that, in the case where I know p, if p were true and if
I were to be told not p, I would nevertheless believe p. For instance, I know that 2+2=4. If
someone were to tell me now that 2+2 is not equal to 4, I would still believe that 2+2=4. My
knowledge that 2+2=4 is robust in that sense. Thus Nozick’s fourth requirement, as stated
in (20), may be expressed more explicitly by:
(21) (Kp ∧ ¬H¬p) → ((p ∧H¬p) > Bp)
That is: in order to know p in a case in which I’m not told not p, if I was told deceptively
that it is not the case that p, I would still believe p. A belief of that kind is a belief that
is robustly true, true against false appearances or deceiving evidence. This formulation is
now compatible with Stalnaker-Lewis truth-conditions, and asks that one consider the most
similar worlds to the actual world in which one’s evidence about the same proposition is
significantly different.
This notion of robustness concerns the justification of one’s knowledge, and contrasts with
the one we presented as a dual to Williamson’s conception of safety, which concerns rather
the extension of one’s knowledge. Indeed, in the case of safety, Williamson describes the
concept as saying that “if at time t on basis b one knows p, and at time t∗ close enough to t
on basis b∗ close enough to b one believes a proposition p∗ close enough to p, then p∗ should
be true” (2000, 102). This concerns the way in which one’s actual knowledge is likely to be
maintained for similar cases, assuming one’s basis or justification is itself sufficiently close
to the actual one. Nozick’s condition 3, by contrast, asks to consider worlds in which one’s
evidence is likely to change with the world itself.
Analogously, the notion of robustness we introduced differs from condition 4 in much
the same way in which safety differs from condition 3. Thinking back to the example of
Socrates: my belief that “Theaetetus” starts with “Th” is robustly true if it is likely to elicit
the belief that “Theodorus” also starts with “Th”. This notion of robustness, we should note,
is characteristic of any form of competence, or “knowing how”: you are good at solving conics
if, when faced with a new instance of a polynomial equation of the same degree, you are able
to solve it in much the same way in which you solved the previous cases you were confronted
with. This says something of the way one’s actual justification for knowledge is likely to cover
new cases, and not something about the way in which one would or would not revise one’s
beliefs if one were told that the evidence or method one actually uses is bad in the first place.
The results of this section can be summarized in the following way. First, the notion of
knowledge reliability has two sides. We called the first safety, following Williamson, and the
second robustness. As we argued, those two notions are dual to each other. This duality
is already present in the analysis Nozick gave of the notion of the reliability of knowledge
in terms of counterfactual sensitivity, but has a different meaning. Nozick’s counterfactual
analysis of the notion of knowledge reliability contrasts with Williamson’s closeness analysis
in so far as the counterfactual analysis deals with the strength of one’s belief in the light of
new or conflicting evidence, whereas the closeness analysis deals with the stability or potential
extension of one’s knowledge with respect to further data.
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1.3 Margin for Error
The notions of safety and robustness which we discussed in the previous section are related to
yet another concept of reliability, which plays an essential role in Williamson’s epistemology,
the notion of margin for error. The margin for error principle, as we will show in this
section, can be seen as a strengthening of Williamson’s safety condition. It also constitutes
a generalization of the principle of factivity. More specifically, however, it was stated by
Williamson in order to describe the notion of inexact or approximate knowledge.
Margin for error principles were first introduced by Williamson in his epistemic account
of vagueness (Williamson 1992, Williamson 1994). Ordinary judgements involving scalar
predicates, namely predicates like “red” or “bald”, which can be mapped to a numerical
scale, do not go by sharp distinctions. We know for sure that someone with fewer than 10
hair on their head is bald, and for sure that someone like Mick Jagger, whom we may suppose
to have more than 100000 hair on his head, is not bald. The trouble lies with intermediate
cases. According to the epistemic account of vagueness, vagueness comes from the limitation
of our discriminative capacities. To say that our discriminative capacities are limited is to
say that they go with a certain margin of error, which stands for the fine-grainedness with
which we are able to make discriminations. Suppose for instance that only a difference of
more than 1000 hair makes a difference in our perception of hairiness (or rather baldness, for
that matter). Under the supposition that the cut-off point between bald and not bald is at
50000 hair, then we may not be able to tell that someone with 49500 hair on their head is
bald. The reason is that someone with only 1000 more hair, namely 50500 hair, is not bald.
In this way, we can explain our inability to say of individuals standing around the cut-off
point between bald and not bald whether they are bald or not.
Conversely, whenever we know that someone with n hair on their hair is bald, then it has
to be the case that someone with n+1000 hair on their head is still bald. Let us represent by
bald(n) the sentence that someone with n hair on their head is bald. Factivity of knowledge
says that, in order to know that someone with n hair on their head is bald, it has to be the
case that someone with n hair on their head is bald:
(22) K(bald(n)) → bald(n)
By analogy, the margin for error principle can be seen as a generalization of factivity to
neighboring cases. In the previous example, for instance, a margin for error of 1000 hair
requires that:
(23) for all i such that |n− i| ≤ 1000, K(bald(n)) → bald(i)
Treating numbers as contexts and matching the predicate bald to the propositional atom p,
this can be expressed in modal terms:
(24) n |= Kp only if for all i such that |n− i| ≤ 1000, i |= p
In Williamson (1994) and Williamson (1997), Gomez-Torrente (1997), and Graff (2000), mar-
gin for error principles like (24) are imposed at the semantic level on the knowledge operator
by giving the epistemic accessibility relation a topological interpretation. Williamson defines
a fixed-margin model as a quadruple 〈W,d, r, V 〉, such that W is a set of worlds, V a propo-
sitional valuation over W , d a distance function between worlds of W , and r a positive real
value. In such a model,
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(25) w |= Kφ iff for all v such that d(w, v) ≤ r, v |= φ
Every fixed-margin model can be seen as a standard Kripke model 〈W,R, V 〉 in which the
epistemic accessibility relation R satisfies: wRv iff d(w, v) ≤ r. A limitation of this rep-
resentation, however, is that it incorporates the margin for error principle directly at the
semantic level, without giving it a corresponding syntactic form. To get an explicit version of
the principle, a different move consists in using a closeness modality, as was done originally
by Arnesen, following a suggestion of van Benthem, as we did already in the previous sec-
tion. Instead of using a distance function, one can then use a similarity relation ∼ between
worlds. To get the correspondence with fixed margin models, it then suffices to set: w ∼ v iff
d(w, v) < r, for some fixed r. We then rephrase the principle by weakening the biconditional
in (25) to a conditional:
(26) w |= Kp only if for all w′ such that w ∼ w′, w′ |= p
This yields the van Benthem-Arnesen formulation of the principle, namely:
(27) Kp → ¤p (Margin for Error)
Margin for Error imposes that, in order to know that p holds, p hold in all contexts that are
relevantly similar to the actual one. Williamson himself presents the margin for error principle
as closely tied to the notion of reliability, by writing: “Where one has a limited capacity to
discriminate between cases in which p is true and cases in which p is false, knowledge requires
a margin for error: cases in which one is in a position to know p must not be too close to
cases in which p is false, otherwise one’s beliefs in the former cases would lack a sufficiently
reliable basis to constitute knowledge” (2000, 17). We should note here that this notion of
reliability is stronger than the notion of safety discussed in the previous section. We could
in principle imagine that at world w, I know p, and that in some case w′ very close to w, p
is false, without my believing that p is true at w′. This would be an instance of safe belief
in the sense previously discussed. However, that kind of safety seems compatible only with a
notion of exact knowledge, capable of drawing sharp boundaries. When knowledge becomes
inexact, Williamson’s remark suggests that one’s beliefs require more safety. This is the case
by assuming Margin for Error, since Safety (as expressed by the schema Kp → ¤(Bp → p))
logically follows from Margin for Error in standard modal logic. Indeed, for ¤ a normal
operator, ¤(q → r) follows from ¤r, hence:
(28) (Kp → ¤p) → (Kp → ¤(Bp → p))
The converse, however, does not hold. To derive Margin for Error from Safety, it is
sufficient to assume a property like Kp → ¤Bp, which expresses that whenever I know p, I
believe p holds at all close cases. This condition, which we might call Persistency, may be
characteristic of belief in situations of approximate knowledge. For instance, if I know that
someone is less than 2 meters tall, maybe I also believe that she is less than 1,99 meters tall
(although I don’t know this for a fact). Together with Margin for Error, Persistency would
entail that whenever Kp holds, p is both true and believed to be true at all sufficiently similar
cases.
A condition like Kp → ¤Bp would be unreasonable to postulate in general, however,
since it would entail Kp → ¤(¬p → Bp), namely that whenever p is known, p is believed
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even at similar cases where p does not hold, a situation of knowledge that would not only
be unsafe, but systematically deviant for close cases. For instance, in the case of knowledge
about prime numbers, which is a variety of exact knowledge, this would predict of someone
who knows that 5 is a prime that they also believe that 6 and 8 are prime, assuming the
latter are relevantly close to 5. In other words, Persistency can be assumed safely for beliefs
that already go about with a margin for error, but not for beliefs whose content is supposed
to be exact.
This raises the question of the validity of margin for error principles in general. Williamson
insists that a margin for error is required “where one has a limited capacity to discriminate
between cases in which p is true and cases in which p is false”. We could argue that any kind
of knowledge is in principle subject to such limitations. We certainly have limited capacities
to discriminate whether a number is a prime, or whether a formula of first-order logic is a
validity or not, despite the fact the the latter is a recursively enumerable property, and the
former even a recursive property. The reply, however, is that the kind of limitation in question
is not comparable to the limitation we experience in perception. Predicates like “prime” or
“logically valid” are not vague predicates, and we are able in principle to discriminate whether
any number is a prime or not. Our knowledge can be exact and yet be subject to all sorts
of practical limitations (of time, speed, memory and so on), without these limitations giving
rise to categorial quandaries of the kind we experience for vague predicates.
This means that margin for error principles are specific of inexact knowledge, in the sense
intended by Williamson. This contrasts with the notions of safety and robustness which we
discussed earlier. These principles make sense also for the kind of exact knowledge involved
in logic or arithmetic, as we tried to illustrate. There remains an area, on the other hand, for
which the question is moot whether it can be a matter of exact knowledge, namely the area
of self-knowledge and introspection. Williamson has argued that introspective knowledge is
also subject to a margin for error, and for that reason that knowledge is not transparent or
luminous in general. This will be the object of the next section to discuss the extent to which
self-knowledge is subjected to the sort of limitation he claims.
2 The reliability of self-knowledge
Traditionally, knowledge is seen as a reflexive capacity satisfying the principle of positive
introspection, which says that if one knows p, one knows that one knows p. This principle was
defended in particular by Hintikka (1962) as one of the fundamental properties of knowledge:
how could I know that 2+2=4 without knowing that I know it? Hintikka mentions a number of
philosophers who have argued in favor of the same thesis. Spinoza probably remains the most
famous, when he claims that whoever has a true idea knows that he has a true idea (Ethics, II,
prop. 43).3 Some counterexamples have been considered, but they remain inconclusive. For
instance, a student who lacks self-confidence might know the answer, and yet fail to believe
he knows. It is unclear, however, to what extent he really knows the answer, if his failure
to believe he knows is in fact due to the belief that the answer might be wrong.4 Hence the
3By “true idea”, Spinoza means an idea that is “adequate”, intending to rule out the case of ideas that
would be true simply by accident.
4See Lewis (1996, 429) on this example. Lewis writes: “I even allow knowledge without belief, as in the case
of the timid student who knows the answer but has no confidence that he has it right and so does not believe
what he knows.” Lewis does not say, however, whether or not knowing that one knows requires believing that
one knows.
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reliability of my believing that I know p seems inherited from the strength of my knowing p.
In Williamson (2000), Williamson presents an indirect argument against the principle of
positive introspection, whose goal is to be radical. The argument rests on the idea that self-
knowledge obeys a principle of margin for error, and on the observation that the conjunction
of margin for error and positive introspection leads to paradoxical conclusions. The aim of
this section will be to challenge the soundness of his argument, and to examine to what extent
the knowledge one can gain by introspection is necessarily subject to the limitations claimed
by Williamson. The first paragraph gives a presentation of Williamson’s argument. In the
next one, I present the criticism Dokic & E´gre´ (2004) made of this argument by defending
the idea that knowledge is modular, and that two forms of knowledge, which we might call
perceptual and reflective, ought to be distinguished in order to state one of Williamson’s
premises. I will conclude by the discussion of some objections to the present account.
2.1 Williamson’s paradox against luminosity
Williamson’s argument against positive introspection is part of a more general criticism of
the idea that knowledge should be luminous. Luminosity is the thesis that whenever I am in
a given mental state, I know that I am in that mental state. For instance, luminosity says
that if I am in the mental state of being cold, then I know that I am cold (or I am in a
position to know that I am cold).5 The principle of positive introspection is a particular case
of the luminosity principle (granting that there are mental states of knowing, an assumption
I shall not dispute here), since it says that, if I am in a state of knowing something, then I am
also in a position to know that I know that thing. Since positive introspection is luminosity
concerning knowledge itself, this means that in principle, one could accept the thesis that
luminosity does not hold in general, while defending the idea that knowledge is nevertheless
positively introspective. In Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson offers to challenge both
claims. In chapter 4 of his book, he states a general argument against luminosity. In chapter
5, he states the same argument in the case of knowledge. Both arguments are given in the
form of puzzles, and take the form of sorites arguments.
Williamson’s general argument against luminosity trades on the assumption that our
judgements on the occurrence or non-occurrence of specific mental states are not a matter of
exact knowledge. Presumably, most of our mental states gradually appear and disappear, so
that our judgements on their occurrence or non-occurrence go about with a certain margin
of error. In the case of a mental state like “feeling cold”, for instance, we have the following
particular instance of margin for error:
(29) If at time t one knows that one feels cold, then at time t + 1 sufficiently close to t, one
feels cold.
Then, assuming one feels cold at t, and that this state is luminous, this entails that one knows
one feels cold at t. But by the previous instance of margin for error, this entails that one feels
cold at t + 1, and by luminosity one knows that one feels cold at t + 1. By induction, if one
feels cold at some time, one should feel cold at all future times, which de facto is not the case.
This leads Williamson to reject luminosity, given that margin for error seems a reasonable
postulate in this context.
5Like Williamson, I shall talk indifferently of knowing that one knows or being in a position to know that one
knows (see Williamson 2000, 95). Likewise, I use the notions of transparency and luminosity interchangeably
in this paper (compare Williamson 2000, 24 and 95 where the terms are given essentially the same definition).
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Williamson’s rejection of positive introspection in chapter 5 rests on a similar argument.
Williamson considers a myopic character, Mr Magoo, who observes a tree at some distance
and makes judgements about its height. Magoo’s knowledge is constrained by the following
margin of error principle:
(30) If Magoo knows that the tree is not of size i, then the tree is not of size i + 1
Williamson (2000, 115) makes the further assumption that ‘Mr Magoo reflects on the limita-
tions of his eyesight and ability to judge heights’, so that the previous principle itself is known
by Magoo. It is further assumed that Magoo’s knowledge is closed under logical consequence,
namely that if Magoo knows all the propositions of some set of propositions, he also knows
any proposition that follows logically from that set.6 If furthermore Magoo’s knowledge is
positively introspective, one reaches a paradoxical conclusion. Let us represent by pi the
sentence “the tree is i inches tall”. The knowledge of Magoo is taken to obey the following
principles:
(31) (ME) K¬pi → ¬pi+1
(KME) K(K¬pi → ¬pi+1)
(KK) Kφ → KKφ
(C) If φ follows logically from a set of propositions Γ, and for all members
ψ of Γ, Kψ holds, then Kφ.
Supposing Magoo knows that the tree is not i inches tall for some value i, we get the following
derivation:
(32) (i) K¬pi, by hypothesis
(ii) K(K¬pi → ¬pi+1), by (KME)
(iii) KK¬pi, by (i) and (KK)
(iv) K¬pi,K¬pi → ¬pi+1 |= ¬pi+1, by propositional reasoning
(v) K¬pi+1, by (ii), (iii), (iv) and (C)
By induction, granted that Magoo knows that the tree is not of size 0, he knows that the tree
is not of any positive size whatsoever, which can’t be the case if knowledge is factive. Thus
we reach a paradoxical conclusion with regard to a scale involving degrees of height, in the
same way in which we reached a paradoxical conclusion with respect to times.
Williamson’s general argument against luminosity and his specific argument against pos-
itive introspection exemplify a common structure which can be seen more perspicuously if
each argument is rephrased within the framework of closeness modalities. Let us represent by
p the proposition that one feels cold, and let us fix a model consisting of time points linearly
ordered in which t ∼ t′ iff t′ = t + 1. Condition (29) is then equivalent to:
(33) t |= Kp only if for every t′ such that t ∼ t′, t′ |= p
6Williamson assumes that this closure principle can be restricted to the propositions “pertinent to the
argument”. The closure assumption is certainly controversial in general, as was pointed out to me on several
occasions, but it is a natural one to make if one assumes as underlying semantics a Kripke-Hintikka style
semantics for knowledge, as we do below. In my opinion, a solution to Williamson’s paradox does not call for
a revision of that particular principle, even though one may wish to put it into question on other grounds.
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This yields the van Benthem-Arnesen formulation of Margin for Error, namely Kp → ¤p.
To say that p is luminous is to say that p satisfies the principle p → Kp. We thus get the
immediate derivation:
(34) Kp → ¤p (Margin for Error)
p → Kp (Luminosity of p)
p → ¤p
Within the model, it therefore follows that if t |= p, then t+1 |= p, which yields the pernicious
sorites progression. The argument against positive introspection can be restated in much the
same way. Assuming margin for error holds uniformly of any complex proposition, it follows
in particular that KKp → ¤Kp, a higher-order form of margin for error which we may call
reflective margin for error. The soritic conclusion follows from positive introspection along
exactly the same lines:
(35) KKp → ¤Kp (Reflective Margin for Error)
Kp → KKp (Positive Introspection)
Kp → ¤Kp
The latter condition yields the pernicious sorites progression in the puzzle of Mr Magoo.
Consider a model consisting of positive sizes that are linearly ordered. Each world i represents
a world in which the size of the tree is of i inches. Suppose i ∼ j iff |i−j| ≤ 1, giving a one-unit
margin for error corresponding to a reflexive and symmetric similarity relation (a slight and
natural generalization of condition (ME) in (31) above). Figure 2 represents such a structure
of inexact knowledge, in which each circled area represents the margin of error around the
middle-point, except of course for 0 where it contains only 0 and 1. The overlap between the
areas explains that one gets a sorites progression. Let pi denote the proposition that the tree
is i inches tall. By definition, pi is supposed to hold only at world i. Supposing the tree is
66 inches tall, it holds that 66 |= K¬p0, from the assumption that, in this case, Magoo sees
the tree is not of size 0. Then from Kp → ¤Kp, 66 |= ¤K¬p0, and so 65 |= K¬p0. By
repeated applications of the same condition, we reach the conclusion that 1 |= ¤K¬p0, and
so 0 |= K¬p0, which can’t be the case if knowledge is factive. The contradiction is even more
direct, since if 1 |= K¬p0, it will follow from Margin for Error that 1 |= ¤¬p0 and therefore
that one should have 0 |= ¬p0. The outcome will of course be the same, however large the
size of the tree.
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Figure 2: A structure of inexact knowledge (1)
This last example is closely related to Gomez-Torrente’s observation that if a proposi-
tion like “a man with 0 hair on their head is bald”, which can be represented by B(0), is
epistemically transparent (it is known, it is known that it is known, and so on), then one’s
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knowledge can’t satisfy all the margin for error principles ∀n(Km+1B(n) → KmB(n + 1)),
where Km stands for m iterations of K (Gomez-Torrente 1997, Graff 2002). For otherwise
it would follow that even a man with a million hair on his head is bald. The modal schema
Kp → ¤p gives another representation of these margin for error principles. If we let the atom
p represent the property of “being bald”, to say that the proposition “a man with 0 hair is
bald” is transparent is to assume that Knp would hold for all n at world 0 in a linear structure
similar to that of Figure 2 (setting i ∼ j iff j = i + 1). From the normality of ¤, however, it
follows that the schema Knp → ¤np holds for all n, which would constrain p to hold at all
worlds in the structure, including at world 1000000. More generally, p → ¤np holds for all
luminous p, assuming Margin for Error. The idea that at least some propositions might be
transparent has therefore led Gomez-Torrente and Graff to question the validity of margin
for error principles, although they have not discussed the validity of positive introspection in
general in situation of inexact knowledge: one may conceive indeed that positive introspection
might hold for some restricted class of known propositions (which are then transparent), but
not systematically.
Before discussing this point more thoroughly, we should note that a property like p → ¤p
is a potential source of paradox, depending on the semantic status of p and the way the relation
∼ is defined within a knowledge structure. For instance, if p is to represent “I feel cold”, and
is supposed to hold for some finite set of thermometric degrees in a linear structure analogous
to that of Figure 2, then assuming knowledge brings about the same kind of fixed margin
for error, the property constrains the value of p to stretch out of its intended extension. On
the other hand, if p is a permanent proposition, no paradox is threatening. To illustrate the
point, let us suppose that p stands for “2+2=4”, and that the scale of similarity is constituted
by contiguous instants on the temporal line. Then p holds everywhere in the model. Since
p holds everywhere, the margin for error principle Kp → ¤p is trivially satisfied, and the
conclusion p → ¤p is harmless.
Thus whether there is a paradox or not depends on the nature of the property involved. As
Leitgeb (2002, 200) notes, Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument is rightly called a paradox,
since it is a valid argument starting from plausible premises and yielding an implausible
conclusion. The argument can be seen as a form of epistemic sorites. Importantly, however,
Williamson insists that his argument does not rest essentially on the vagueness of predicates
like “feeling cold” or “knowing”, but on the fact that “we have limited powers of discrimination
amongst our own sensations” (2000, 104). We can agree with him that vagueness is not
essential, but it remains essential that the predicates or propositions involved do not hold
universally (see Williamson 1994, 271-272). As the semantic version of his arguments given
in (34) and (35) makes clear, a contradiction follows only if enough semantic assumptions are
made on the interpretation of p and ¤ so that the schema p → ¤p gives rise to a pernicious
induction.
The case is similar with the schema Kp → ¤Kp. Take the same eternal proposition p and
interpret closeness by temporal contiguity over instants (t ∼ t′ iff t′ = t + 1). This says that
if I know that 2+2=4, then I know that 2+2=4 at all subsequent times. No paradox arises
here. The situation is quite different if p stands for “I feel cold”. For in the same model,
if I know that I feel cold at time t, then at all times t′ subsequent to t, I should know that
at t′ I feel cold. This is now very problematic, but on the other hand the problem seems
partly related to the expressiveness of the modal language used to state the puzzle. If we
shift to a first-order modal language (or to an extended modal language) in which instants
can be named in the object language, so that P (t) means that I am cold at time t, it would
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be reasonable to rephrase the condition Kp → ¤Kp in the form KP (t) → ¤KP (t), in a way
which permits to avoid hidden indexical reference to the time of evaluation. In that case, even
if ¤ is given the same temporal interpretation, this leads to no paradox, since this entails:
(36) t |= KP (t) only if for all t′ ∼ t, t′ |= KP (t)
instead of the problematic:
(37) t |= KP (t) only if for all t′ ∼ t, t′ |= KP (t′)
A condition like (36), which follows from the corresponding versions of Positive Introspection
and Reflective Margin for Error, implies that for me to know at time t that P holds at t, it
has to be the case that at every subsequent time t′ I also know at t′ that P holds at t: this
now states a more reasonable property of self-knowledge, and not necessarily a pernicious
condition, even when the property is a non-permanent property such as “feeling cold”. The
case is not satisfactory yet, however, since I can very well forget that I was feeling cold at
some past time, even if at that time I knew that I was feeling cold, and knew that I knew it.
If we modify the basic margin for error principle Kp → ¤p in the same manner, the
principle will be written: KP (t) → ¤P (t). Semantically, this will have the consequence that:
if t |= KP (t), then for all t′ ∼ t, t′ |= P (t). This condition becomes vacuous, however, since if
at time t I know that P holds at t, then by factivity P holds at t, but then P (t) remains true
at any time subsequent to t. This modification of the margin for error principle seems now
too weak. What this suggests, nevertheless, is that the basic margin for error principle and
its reflective version may be given different interpretations. What I shall argue in the next
section is that mental states such as “feeling cold” and “knowing that one feels cold” are not
necessarily subject to the same margins for error in order to be known.
2.2 Reflective vs. perceptual knowledge
In this section I argue that margin for error principles do make sense for our knowledge of
phenomenal properties, provided that these phenomenal properties do not pertain to the oc-
currence or non-occurrence of knowledge itself. The argument, originally put forward in Dokic
& E´gre´ (2004), rests on the idea that different kinds or methods of knowledge are involved
in Williamson’s argument against positive introspection, and that one should distinguish a
notion of perceptual knowledge from a notion of reflective knowledge. Granted this distinc-
tion, one can argue that perceptual knowledge and reflective knowledge do not have the same
reliability conditions, and that reflective knowledge, in particular, is not necessarily subject
to the same kinds of margin of error as perceptual knowledge.
I look at a chair in my office and I wonder how tall it might be. I am confident that it is
less than 2 meters tall. Maybe I know this partly on the basis of inference: I know from my
last medical record that I am less than 2 meters tall, and I know visually that I am taller than
the chair. Still, my judgement that I am taller than the chair makes essential use of my vision
and is subject to a margin for error: I consider that the chair is significantly smaller than me
to conclude that it is less than 2 meters tall. Indeed, if I now look at the bookshelves and
wonder whether that particular shelf is fixed above or below 2 meters from the ground, I am
no longer confident about whether the top of my head might reach the shelf or not. However,
I am confident that I know that the chair is less than 2 meters tall: I believe I know that the
chair is less than 2 meters tall. Moreover, I also know that I believe that I know this. And
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upon reflection, I know that I know that I believe I know this. It seems to me I could go on
indefinitely. This kind of reflective knowledge, the knowledge I have upon my own beliefs,
does not seem to me to fade off in principle, and does not seem subject to the same kind of
margin of error as my knowledge that the chair is less than 2 meters tall.
What this example suggests is that the limitations of my visual knowledge, or of knowl-
edge acquired on the basis of my visual perception, are not on a par with the limitations of
my reflective knowledge, namely knowledge about my own epistemic states and capacities. In
Dokic & E´gre´ (2004), this distinction between perceptual and reflective knowledge was intro-
duced upon close inspection of Williamson’s specific argument against positive introspection,
as given above in its syntactic version (32). The puzzle rests on the condition (KME), namely
K(K¬pi → ¬pi+1), which expresses the knowledge Magoo has of the limitations of his visual
knowledge. Thus (KME) expresses Magoo’s knowledge that his visual knowledge obeys (ME),
namely K¬pi → ¬pi+1. The main difference between (ME) and (KME) is that (ME) is a
non-iterative principle, in which ¬pi expresses a phenomenal property concerning the outside
world (“the tree is not i inches tall”). Accordingly, (ME) expresses a property of Magoo’s
visual knowledge. By contrast, (KME) can’t express a property of Magoo’s visual knowledge
only: for then the principle should mean that Magoo knows visually that if he knows visually
that the tree is not i inches tall, the tree is not i + 1 inches tall. But is this higher-order
form of knowledge really a kind of visual knowledge? This does not seem plausible. The
reason seems fairly general. Suppose I see that it’s raining outside the window. Then I know
visually that it’s raining. And presumably, I also know that I know that it’s raining. But my
knowing that I know is not visual knowledge, at least its content is sufficiently distinct that
we postulate this form of knowledge to be of a different kind.
If this analysis is correct, this suggests that Williamson’s argument, although formally
valid, rests on a potential equivocation, by neglecting a property of modularity of our knowl-
edge system. The principle (KME) ought to be rephrased in terms of two knowledge modali-
ties. Let Kpi express perceptual knowledge and K reflective knowledge, then (KME) is more
adequately expressed as (KME’), namely:
(KME’) K(Kpi¬pi → ¬pi+1)
To see whether this gives us a way out of the paradox, however, it is necessary to give a
plausible reformulation of the other principles involved in the puzzle. A minimal adjustment
consists in maintaining the supposition that K is closed under logical consequence, and adding
the following bridge principle (KK’), namely:
(KK’) Kpiφ → KKpiφ
(C’) If φ follows logically from a set of propositions Γ, and for all members ψ of Γ, Kψ
holds, then Kφ.
(KK’) is a mixed variant of positive introspection: in the scenario of Mr Magoo, this means
that if Magoo knows visually p, then he is in a position to know reflectively that he knows
visually p. The interest of this reformulation is that it still gives rise to a derived rule, but
not as strong as the original one:
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(38) (i) Kpi¬pi, by hypothesis
(ii) K(Kpi¬pi → ¬pi+1), by (KME)
(iii) KKpi¬pi, by (i) and (KK)
(iv) Kpi¬pi,Kpi¬pi → ¬pi+1 |= ¬pi+1, by propositional reasoning
(v) K¬pi+1, by (ii), (iii), (iv) and (C’)
In this case, Kpi¬pi entails K¬pi+1. Thus, supposing Magoo knows visually that tree is not
of size 0, he knows reflectively that the tree is not of size 1 either, but no further propagation
need arise. This means that Magoo can know reflectively that the tree is not of size i + 1
when he sees that it is not of size i, but his knowledge that the tree is not of size i + 1 is
not necessarily an item of direct perceptual knowledge.7 This gives a fair illustration of the
idea that perceptual knowledge and reflective knowledge correspond to distinct modules. The
case of visual illusions (like the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion) shows that one can fail to see that two
lines are equal, for instance, while knowing, through a different information channel, that
those two lines are equal. This does not count as direct evidence for the present argument,
of course, but this should at least support the plausibility of the distinction between different
forms of knowledge. In the same way as a visual illusion can persist despite one’s knowing
that it is an illusion, it is conceivable that one fails to see that some object is not of size i + 1
while knowing that it is not of that size from reflection on one’s visual abilities. We should
note, moreover, that the new derived rule, albeit strong, implies that one has a correct grasp
of the limitation of one’s perceptual knowledge through margin for error.
2.3 Logics for modular knowledge
In order to make the articulation between reflective and perceptual knowledge more explicit,
it is appropriate to give more details about the definition of a system of modular knowledge.
I sketch three distinct approaches here. All of them rest on the idea that some mechanism
of syntactic restriction is needed to model the distinction between perceptual knowledge and
reflective knowledge.
To get a system of combined knowledge richer than the one we just presented on the basis
of Williamson’s principles, the first option is to define an axiomatic system of two epistemic
modalities such that:
(i) K is an S4 modality
(ii) Kpi satisfies axiom T, namely Kpiφ → φ
(iii) (KK’) holds, namely Kpiφ → KKpiφ
(iv) The system is closed under modus ponens and K-generalization
(v) Only non-epistemic sentences can occur in the scope of Kpi.
Let us call KK′ this system. The syntactic restriction in (v) is intended to reflect the fact
that perceptual knowledge is not iterative, and that it applies only to phenomenal properties.
Likewise, since the system is not closed under Kpi-generalization, it won’t follow from Kp,
for instance, that KpiKp. Conversely, since K is an S4 modality, it satisfies the principle
of positive introspection. This assumption is natural to make about reflective knowledge, if
the notion of reflective knowledge is seen as a form of higher-order knowledge which can be
self-applied.
7See Dokic & E´gre´ (2004) for a concrete illustration of this situation with the puzzle of the Glimpse, a
perceptual variant of the Surprise Examination Paradox stated by Williamson (2000, chap. 6).
19
Since the system is closed under K-generalization, KK′ ⊢ K(Kpiφ → φ) for every appro-
priate φ. It follows from that and from (KK’) that KK′ ⊢ Kpiφ → Kφ for every appropriate
φ. This, we should note, does not go counter to the distinction between perceptual and re-
flective knowledge, provided the converse does not hold. If we consider the extension of KK′
in which Kpi is a normal operator, and such that the system is closed under Kpi-generalization
and uniform substitution, we get a normal system which is sound and complete for the class of
frames 〈W,R, Rpi〉 such that R is reflexive and transitive, Rpi is reflexive, and xRpiz whenever
xRy and yRpiz. It is easy to show that Kφ → Kpiφ is not derivable in that system by means of
an appropriate counter-model, and consequently that it is not derivable in the weaker system
KK
′.
The main merit of a system of knowledge like KK′ is that the two forms of knowledge,
perceptual and reflective, are related in such a way that any perceptual content can be taken
as input to knowledge of a different kind, without any collapse between the two modalities.
A main shortcoming of this approach, on the other hand, is that margin for error principles
have to be added explicitly, as above with the axiom (KME’), and that we have no explicit
semantics for the operator Kpi, which is supposed to be non-normal.
To remedy this, a second option, suggested by J. van Benthem (p.c.), would be to modify
the principles used in (35) to give the semantic version of Williamson’s paradox. Instead of
making an explicit distinction between perceptual and reflective knowledge, one can keep a
single knowledge operator and add a closeness modality, and restrict the Margin for Error
principle “to just the case of atomic propositions, thought of as observational (whose values
then have to obey some geometrical constraints), while leaving matters open for arbitrary
assertions φ with iterated knowledge modalities” (van Benthem, p.c.). This is tantamount to
making an implicit distinction between perceptual and reflective knowledge, but this enables
us to keep a standard semantics for knowledge.
Arnesen 2004 presents a normal system of modal logic with two operators K and ¤ whose
axiomatic correspondent can be restricted in this way. A margin for error model is a quadruple
〈W,R,∼, V 〉 such that:
M, w |= Kφ iff for every w′ such that wRw′,M,w′ |= φ
M, w |= ¤φ iff for every w′ such that w ∼ w,M,w′ |= φ
In Arnesen’s approach, the relation ∼ is taken to be a similarity relation, reflexive and sym-
metric, but not necessarily transitive, just as the epistemic accessibility in Williamson’s fixed-
margin models (see Williamson 1994 and Graff 2002). Thus ¤ is supposed to satisfy the
T-axiom ¤φ → φ and the Brouwersche or B-axiom ¬φ → ¤¬¤φ. In Arnesen’s original
system, the Margin for Error principle Kφ → ¤φ was unrestricted, giving rise to the prob-
lematic principle Kφ → ¤Kφ. Restricting it to atomic propositions, or even to non-epistemic
propositions, permits to block that derivation. Thus we may call K¤∗ the bimodal system
consisting of:
(i) An S4 basis for K
(ii) A BT basis for ¤
(iii) The principle Kφ → ¤φ, restricted to a distinguished set of non-modal
sentences φ.
Relative to K¤∗, K also denotes general knowledge, just as K in the system KK′. The
operator implicitly refers to a form of perceptual knowledge in all the cases where it applies
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to some proposition for which Margin for Error will hold, and it refers to a form of reflective
knowledge in all cases where it takes in its scope sentences already containing occurrences of
K.
I sketch, finally, a third option, which would be to go along with only one knowledge
modality, without adding a closeness modality to the language, but to treat differently the
semantics of sentences of the form Kφ, depending on the syntactic status of φ. Thus, we
could try to define a non-standard semantics such that: (i) if φ is a purely propositional
formula (meaning a formula not containing any occurrence of K), then given a Kripke model
〈W,R, V 〉, w |= Kφ iff for every w′ such that wRw′, w′ |= φ according to the standard rules;
(ii) if φ is a formula of the form Kψ, then w |= Kφ iff w |= Kψ. We thus give iterative formulas
and non-iterative formulas a distinct treatment. For instance, let us imagine a structure of
inexact knowledge like Figure 3, where the numbers represent degrees on a thermometric
scale. Like the cells of Figure 2, the arrows represent the relation of tactile indiscernibility,
which is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive. Let p represent “feeling cold”, and let
us suppose that the cut-off point between feeling cold and not feeling cold is between 1 and
2, so that p holds only at 0 and 1.8
0
¼¼
oo // 1
¼¼
oo // 2
¼¼
oo // 3
¼¼
oo // 4
¼¼
p p ¬p ¬p ¬p
Figure 3: A structure of inexact knowledge (2)
According to the semantics, 0 |= Kp, 3 |= K¬p, but 1 2 Kp and likewise 2 2 K¬p. Thus, at
0 I know that I feel cold, at 3 I know that I don’t feel cold, but at intermediate cases I don’t
know whether I feel cold or not. The usual semantics would predict that 0 2 KKp, since
0R1 and 1 2 Kp. However, according to the revised semantics, since 0 |= Kp, it follows that
0 |= KKp. Likewise, 3 |= KK¬p. The structure represents a situation in which knowledge
about coldness does obey a margin for error, but such that knowledge can satisfy positive
introspection.
The semantics is still incompletely specified, however, since it does not say how to evaluate
Kφ when φ does contain an occurrence of K but does not start with K. We could stipulate
that (iii) if φ is of the form ¬Kψ, then w |= Kφ iff w |= φ. That would make knowledge
negatively introspective. With respect to the previous model, condition (iii) predicts that
2 |= K¬K¬p and 2 |= K¬Kp, that is I know that I don’t know whether I feel cold or
not. Finally, it remains unclear how we should evaluate mixed formulae like K(p ∨Kp) and
K(p ∧ Kq). In the case of a conjunctive formula containing an occurrence of K, it seems
reasonable to stipulate that w |= K(φ ∧ ψ) if and only if w |= Kφ and w |= Kψ, just as in
the case of purely propositional formulas. The case of a disjunction containing an occurrence
of K is more problematic, however. We might stipulate further that a disjunction containing
an occurrence of K is known if at least one of the disjuncts is known. The rationale for such
8We should note that “feeling cold” can be ambiguous, due to the ambiguity of the expression “feeling”. It
can mean being cold simpliciter, or feeling that one is cold in the sense of being aware that one is cold. Being
cold simpliciter is just the occurrence of a phenomenal property, which we may represent by p, as opposed to
being aware that one is cold, which we should represent by Kp. Like Williamson, we take “feeling cold” in the
first, non-reflective sense, just like “having hope”, or “being in pain”. Like Williamson we conceive that one
might feel cold, have hope, or be in pain without being aware yet that one is in such mental states.
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a rule is given by the case of epistemic formulas like K(Kp ∨K¬p): this means that I know
that I know which of p or ¬p holds. But intuitively, this should entail that I know that I
know p, or that I know that I know ¬p. Furthermore, the semantics validates formulas like
K(¬Kp ∨ p) (that is K(Kp → p)) and K(Kp ∨ ¬Kp) (that is K(Kp → Kp)).
Although the rule for disjunction looks like an intuitionistic rule, it does not hold for
purely propositional formulas like p∨¬p. The problem, however, is that the semantics makes
wrong predictions in the case of more complicated mixed formulas like [(p ∧ (Kp ∨ ¬Kp) ∨
¬p ∧ (Kp ∨ ¬Kp)]. Although this formula is a tautology, the semantics predicts that it is
known provided p is known or ¬p is known. This suggests not only that the semantics is too
stipulative, but also that a more principled representation should be given of the notion of
perceptual content. In particular, the semantics should not cut across tautological contents
depending on whether they are expressed by means of modal or non-modal formulas.
A more adequate attempt to formulate a semantics capable of validating the principle of
positive introspection without giving rise to Williamson’s paradox was suggested to me by
Denis Bonnay. The idea is to have a semantics which will validate the principle of positive in-
trospection without thereby making the corresponding accessibility relation transitive. Given
a Kripke structure 〈W,R, V 〉, we simultaneously define two notions of satisfaction, one for
single worlds and one for couples of worlds, namely w |= φ and (w,w′) |= φ. The clauses for
atoms and Boolean connectives are the usual ones in the simple case. In the case of a couple,
the satisfaction of atoms is evaluated relative to the second component, and the Boolean
clauses are also straightforward. Thus we have:
(i) For a propositional atom p, (w,w′) |= p iff w′ ∈ V (p).
(ii) (w, w′) |= ¬φ iff (w, w′) 2 φ.
(iii) (w, w′) |= (φ ∧ ψ) iff (w, w′) |= φ and (w,w′) |= ψ.
(iv) (w, w′) |= (φ ∨ ψ) iff (w, w′) |= φ or (w, w′) |= ψ.
The interesting clauses are the clauses for the epistemic operators, that is:
(a) w |= Kφ iff for every w′ such that wRw′, (w, w′) |= φ.
(b) (w, w′) |= Kφ iff w |= Kφ.
Clause (a) corresponds to the standard semantics for knowledge. Together with clause (b),
however, it ensures that instead of looking at worlds that are two steps away to check whether
KKφ is satisfied, one backtracks to the current world to check whether Kφ is satisfied there.
Relative to the structure of Figure 3, it is easily seen that 0 |= Kp, since (0, 0) |= p and
(0, 1) |= p, and hence 0 |= KKp, for (0, 0) |= Kp and (0, 1) |= Kp. But it is still the case
that 1 2 Kp, since (1, 2) 2 p. A formula will be called valid if it holds at every single world
of every structure according to the semantics. It can be checked that the semantics validates
the principle of positive introspection: given a structure in which w |= Kφ, if w 2 KKφ, then
there is an accessible w′ such that (w,w)′ 2 Kφ, and so w 2 Kφ, against the hypothesis. The
semantics also validates negative introspection. Take a structure in which w |= ¬Kφ. Then
if it were not the case that w |= K¬Kφ, there would be an accessible world w′ such that
(w, w′) |= Kφ, and so we would have w |= Kp, a contradiction.
Like the previous semantics, this semantics also validates a formula like K(Kp → p)
(although not necessarily Kφ → φ, which means that the system should primarily be seen as a
system of introspective belief). Unlike the previous semantics, however, it makes K[(p∧(Kp∨
¬Kp)∨¬p∧(Kp∨¬Kp)] valid, without entailing Kp∨K¬p. The case of mixed formulae may
still give rise to too strong predictions, however, since K(φ∨Kψ) entails Kφ∨Kψ. We may
wonder whether this is plausible in full generality. We should note here that this entailment
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does not hold in a normal modal logic like K, nor in the stronger system T. However, it
holds in a stronger system like S5, as a consequence of the principle of negative introspection.
Thus, someone who wants to deny the entailment from K(φ∨Kψ) to Kφ∨Kψ may wish to
reject negative introspection. One can note here that the operator K also satisfies Kripke’s
distribution axiom K(φ → ψ) → (Kφ → Kψ), and that the semantics is sound for the rule
of necessitation, in the sense that if φ holds in every structure at every world according to
the present semantics, then so does Kφ. It can be checked that the semantics is also sound
for the rule of uniform substitution, which means that the semantics is sound more generally
for the normal logic K45, and we may conjecture that the system K45 is also complete for
this revised semantics, a point I leave for further investigation.9
A question we have not solved here is whether it is possible to give a natural semantics
which would tolerate margin for error and licence positive introspection without also validating
negative introspection. What may be pointed out, however, is that the assumption of negative
introspection is just as plausible as the assumption of positive introspection for the scenarios
considered by Williamson in his attack on luminosity. Indeed, Williamson considers a process
in which “one thoroughly considers how hot or cold one feels” (2000, 97), and it seems at
least plausible, in such a case, to conceive that I don’t know whether I feel cold or not while
nevertheless knowing that I don’t know. This does not mean, of course, that we should argue
for the plausibility of the principle of negative introspection in all situations of knowledge
alike, due to well known examples of false beliefs or unawareness for which the principle
breaks down.10
2.4 Reply to some objections
If our analysis of Williamson’s paradox is correct, it means that the principle of margin for
error and the principle of positive introspection can coexist, provided each one is referred
to the appropriate kind of knowledge. In the first logic we just discussed, this separation is
effected by supposing that perceptual knowledge is not iterative, so that a fortiori it can’t
be positively introspective, and by supposing that reflective knowledge, which is positively
introspective, does not bring about a margin of error. Likewise, in the system K¤∗, there is
a class of non-epistemic propositions φ whose knowledge requires a margin for error, but for
which iterations of knowledge are not constrained in the same way. In our revised semantics
for knowledge, finally, iterated modalities are not given the same treatment as non-iterative
ones. To rebut any suspicion of adhocity, we need to examine whether our claim of modularity
is sufficiently motivated. To do this, we shall address three objections.
The first objection concerns the evidence we have that perceptual knowledge is not it-
erative. Do we have sufficient empirical evidence that visual knowledge, for instance, is not
iterative? Or more precisely, that meta-knowledge about one’s visual knowledge is not it-
self visual? Likewise, if we think back to the example of “feeling cold”, my knowing that
I feel cold goes through a specific perceptual channel: what grounds do we have to claim
that meta-knowledge about this kind of tactile knowledge is not itself tactile? This objection
was formulated in very clear terms by J. Snyder (p.c.), who notes that: “at the eye doctor,
examining the eye charts, I discover that I cannot read letters below a certain size. This
certainty seems to be perceptual knowledge of the limitations of my perceptual capabilities”
9Denis Bonnay and I are still working on the logic at the present moment, and I shall leave a more detailed
presentation of the system for further work.
10See Williamson (2000, 23) for such a case of false belief, entailing the unawareness of one’s ignorance.
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(Snyder, p.c.). To be sure, let us imagine that I perceive a letter of which I can’t tell whether
it is an O or a D. I then conclude: “even if it is a D, I can’t exclude visually that it is an
O”. Let us imagine further that I can see nevertheless that the letter is either a D or an O.
Formally, this scenario seems to support the following statements: Kpi(D∨O), and moreover
Kpi(D → ¬Kpi¬O), that is, “I see that, if it’s a D, then for all I see it might be an O”.
The reply, however, is that we should distinguish more firmly between visual experience
and judgement. My judgement that even if it is a D, I might see an O, is sustained by my
visual experience. However, this is not sufficient to affirm that the content of this judgement
is itself visual. It seems more plausible to say that this judgement about my visual limitations
is a piece of reflective knowledge, acquired on the basis of my visual experience. I don’t “see”
that I might be seeing an O when there is a D, in the same way in which I see that it’s an O
or a D.
This brings us to the second objection, which concerns the evidence we have that so-called
reflective knowledge is not subject to margin for error. In Dokic & E´gre´ (2004), this point
is motivated by reference to the notion of ascent routine, as defined by Gordon (1995). The
transition from the visual experience that p to the judgement “I see p” is an example of such
an ascent routine. Ascent routines seem to be reliable methods of self-knowledge without a
margin for error. At any rate it is highly dubious that they should rest on the same kinds of
margins as are involved at the primary level. The transition from my sensory experience of
feeling cold to the judgement “I feel cold” is another example of ascent routine. Undoubtedly,
one needs to feel cold with a sufficient intensity to consciously feel cold, and this supports
Williamson’s claim that knowing that one feels cold requires a margin for error. But in a
situation in which I have reached that intensity, and am aware that I feel cold, my judgement
“I feel cold” will in turn support the fact that I know that I know that I feel cold. Thus, even
if my primary knowledge is not simultaneous with my sensory experience, it is consistent to
assume that the transition to higher levels of knowledge is simultaneous with the occurrence
of my primary knowledge.
A similar point is made by Leitgeb (2002, 203) in his review of Williamson (2000), when
he writes that we could imagine “the phenomenal system and the cognitive system...tuned to
each other”, in such a way that luminosity might hold. Leitgeb calls feeling cold a phenomenal
property, as opposed to knowing that one feels cold, which he calls a cognitive property. As
Leitgeb rightly emphasizes, each property goes with a distinct scale of similarity, since the
similarity between shades of feeling cold is not the same as the similarity between belief states.
To say that luminosity might hold is to imagine that the scales could match each other in
such a way that the transition from not feeling cold to feeling cold would be matched by a
simultaneous transition from not knowing that one is feeling cold to knowing that one is feeling
cold. Taking things one level higher up, what we are suggesting here is that the metacognitive
system (knowing that one knows) and the cognitive system (primary knowing) are likely to
be tuned to each other in that sense, even if the cognitive system and the phenomenal system
are not.11
11It does not matter for the argument whether there is an actual “metacognitive” system distinct from
the “cognitive” system, although this is consistent with the idea that perceptual knowledge and reflective
knowledge may correspond to distinct modules. One can nevertheless talk of a scale of similarity for the
property of “knowing that one knows”, distinct from the scale of similarity for the property of knowing
simply. What we are saying is that these two scales are more likely to match each other or be calibrated, to
use Leitgeb’s vocabulary, than the cognitive scale (knowing that one is cold) and the scale attached to the
phenomenal property (being cold).
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The vision of self-knowledge defended by Williamson is different in this respect. For
Williamson, my knowing that I feel cold is a phenomenal property in much the same way in
which my feeling cold is a phenomenal property. More accurately, the former is to my knowing
that I know what the latter is to my primary knowing. This is why Williamson insists on the
idea that each new iteration of knowledge should bring about an additional margin for error.
In this respect, however, we can only support the cautious claims made by Leitgeb when he
writes that whether or not our cognitive system might be tuned to the phenomenal system
in a way which supports luminosity is an empirical question, which should be investigated
partly by empirical methods. A priori, however, the cognitive system and the metacognitive
system (granting that distinction) are more likely to be tuned to each other than the cognitive
system and the phenomenal system, since the formers involve the same kind of similarity.
This leads directly to the third objection, finally, which concerns the generality of this
reply to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Here we focussed on Williamson’s specific
argument against the principle of positive introspection. If this analysis is correct, what we
are saying is that the mental state of knowing p might be luminous, even if p itself is not
a luminous condition. Feeling cold, among other phenomenal properties, is not necessarily
luminous, since I can be in a state where I am cold without knowing that I am cold. So far,
we agree with Williamson that not every mental state is luminous. Where we disagree with
Williamson is on the idea that “we have no cognitive home”, namely on the idea that no
mental condition is luminous. Indeed, a case in which I know that I am feeling cold is also
a state in which I am in a position to know that I know that I feel cold, even if for me to
perceive that I am cold at the first level, I need a sufficient margin for error. At any rate,
Williamson has not proved that knowledge about one’s knowledge involves a margin for error,
in the same way in which he has made plausible the idea that most situations of perceptual
knowledge are situations of inexact knowledge which rely on a margin of error.
3 Conclusion
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument is not only challenging and intriguing, but the em-
phasis Williamson puts on margin for error principles is probably one of the most inspiring
suggestions that have been made in recent years in the field of formal epistemology. One
important reason for this, as we have seen, is that the principle of margin for error general-
izes the notion of factivity, and that it brings the notion of reliability into an area in which
the notions of truth and logical consequence have received most of the attention for a long
time. Another reason is that margin for error principles take epistemic logic closer to the
domain of cognitive psychology. By affirming against Williamson that his argument neglects
an important dimension of modularity of our knowledge, the intention of this paper is also to
make a further step in this direction. Although the claim that knowledge is modular should
be fairly uncontroversial, more work needs to be done to give an adequate logical representa-
tion of the interaction between the notions of perceptual knowledge and reflective knowledge
which we have distinguished, and to provide empirical evidence for the well-foundedness of
the distinction.
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